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3Rector of ISS, colleagues, friends, ladies and gentlemen, a very 
personal welcome to you all.
An inaugural address is a moment for personal reflection. For 
me, it is a unique moment that is not ‘business as usual’, but 
a privileged opportunity to share new ideas and be challenged 
by your responses.  
What follows draws on a long journey of conversations and 
many strands of thinking and enquiry about the way the 
world works and could better do so for all its inhabitants 
and subsequent generations.  My central proposal is that the 
thinking and practice of aided development would benefit 
from dedicated attention to a body of ideas that constitute a 
theory of complexity.  The challenge of this address is to make 
a convincing case for this point of view.  Doing so relies on 
two arguments.  First, that complexity analysis offers a coher-
ent way for understanding and updating the uncertainties 
involved in social processes, aided or otherwise.  Second, that 
this type of understanding can equip those involved in devel-
opment work to be more effective at navigating through the 
turbulent, unpredictable world of aided change.  Some propo-
nents argue that complexity qualifies as a new paradigm for 
development (e.g., Rihani, 2005).  Only time will tell.  For the 
present, my approach is pragmatic.  Let us engage by exploring 
what complexity does and does not have to offer development: 
in this case through the lens of civil society, civic agency and 
civic driven change.
The address winds along a path that resembles the game of 
snakes and ladders.  From a starting point within development 
studies, ladders accelerate us forward to elements that arise 
in subsequent sections, while snakes feed back to illustrate or 
nuance previous ideas.  In other words, this is an iterative story 
that reflects features of complexity itself.
4Part I locates the address within the area of scholarship known 
as development studies.  This field is fuelled by debates that 
reflect contentions within social science that have a bearing 
on the story I am telling.  Part II prepares the analytic ground 
by tackling the issue of complexity as a ‘science’, where the 
criterion of prediction is central.  The result of this analysis 
leads to a proposition that complexity is a systems theory of 
uncertainty in social processes where the quest for stability is 
an important driver or force.  Then, to reduce the problem of 
multiple interpretations, key terms and concepts associated 
with complexity are defined.  
Part III, introduces the concept of society as a complex adap-
tive system with distinct, interrelated characteristics.  To aid 
comprehension, other analysts make comparisons between 
simple, complicated and complex relational models.  This 
method can be misleading.  Care must be taken to ensure 
that comparisons are made between like and like.  Doing so 
removes a confusing conflation of social and natural science 
examples.  Part IV moves the complexity discussion into the aid 
system and identifies obstacles in doing so.  Difficulties appear 
in institutional drag and professional scepticism, requiring a 
well considered strategy for engaging the development com-
munity in a complexity debate.  This is followed by a descrip-
tion of the aid system with a first look at different degrees 
of uncertainty associated with sectors of health, education, 
agriculture and governance.  Part V, moves to application.  It 
discusses civic driven change and links to complexity through 
civic agency.  There fact that civic agency is not located in any 
particular institutional domain is highlighted and two brief 
cases are used to illustrate this point.   Finally, Part VI pro-
vides five arguments in favour of applying complexity theory 
to aided-development, with suggestions about where further 
effort is merited 
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LOCATING THE STORY
A central question within the original context of development 
studies is ‘who wins and who loses from change in society, 
how, why and what are the transmission mechanisms in play 
over time?  Since the advent of aided-development, answers to 
this question have been dominated by discourse and metrics 
of economic growth which, as Joseph Stiglitz (1998) pointed 
out, became the ends rather than the means of improvement 
in human well-being.  Pulling many nongovernmental organi-
sations (NGOs) in its wake, despite participatory language and 
people-centred attempts, mainstream development remains 
characterised by econometrically modelled, elite-based, target-
ed, supposedly apolitical, technically specialised and profes-
sionally sectoralised thinking and practices.  The development 
enterprise has still not learned how to substantively embody 
and empower those whose existence justifies its investment – 
the poor.  
Perhaps this outcome is not so surprising.  Official aid has 
always been more or less of geo-political instrument for giver 
and receiver.  Overt measures of development performance 
– with either economic or human measures - were never the 
determining yardstick for macro aid allocation.  Politics was 
and remains so.  However, the interregnum between the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union and attacks by al Qu’aeda, gave a 
window for primacy of moral motivations and for efforts to 
structurally tackle systemic shortcomings detailed by Roger 
Riddell (2007).  But, this was not to be.  Incremental, technical 
improvements, such as those agreed in the Paris Declaration, 
remain the name of the game.
6However, while who wins and who loses is not forgotten, eco-
nomic metrics and developmentism itself are now being more 
broadly challenged than from the ideological left or right of 
old.  In the view of John Rapley (2008), origins of such a shift 
are to be found in an anti-universalistic, post-modernism 
as well as from a reversion to local traditionalisms.  These 
perspectives force attention to both transnational and decen-
tralised forms of resistance and contestation of being incorpo-
rated into a global liberal economic order with aided-change 
as its hand maiden.  They also provide markers for a more 
antagonistic view of development studies voiced by Mohan 
and Giles (2005), who call, amongst others, for greater inter-
disciplinarity and openness to plural rationalities for knowl-
edge production, rather than an over-reliance on positivism. 
To different degrees, arguing for a complexity point of view 
reflects these critiques. 
Meanwhile, on the ground and alongside humanitarian help 
in conflict settings, today’s aid system shows a fixation on 
strengthening the (failed) governance capabilities of state insti-
tutions within the political (security) demands and parameters 
of market-constrained sovereignty.  In doing so, yet again, poor 
and ordinary people are being subordinated to states and mar-
kets as ‘adequate interpreters’ of their aspirations, interests 
and preferences.
This obstinate history has not gone unnoticed.  The need for 
a ‘new’ development paradigm has been championed from 
many quarters and ideological positions.  Such efforts have 
been seen, for example, in public campaigns that ‘50 Years of 
the World Bank is Enough’ by ‘non-reformist reformers’.  These 
protagonists argue that social injustice and deprivation stem 
from the very self-regulated liberal economic model on which 
aid rests.  QED, aid cannot be the solution to the problem of 
poverty and exclusion.  Instead, it acts as a palliative instru-
7ment of containment which serves the already powerful ‘giv-
ers’.  On the other hand, the choice for ‘critical engagement’ 
pursued by ‘reformist reformers’ also seeks social justice, but 
does not challenge the fundamentals of the economic model 
currently shaping (the politics of) an interdependent world 
order.2  For them, the present economic system – and its 
dysfunctions - can be and must be better ‘governed’ for the 
good of all.  Such contending ‘reformers’ correspond to dis-
tinct ‘political projects’ (Dagnino, 2008) defining what society 
should become and how to get there.
However, both reformisms share a common premise and 
requirement, namely, that polities’ exercise adequate control 
over the tiered forces that co-determine their lives.  In other 
words, both political projects must address the issue of attain-
ing a political configuration that confers adequate citizen 
control over state power - the central principle of a democratic 
order.  This requirement must be satisfied under conditions of 
globalising inter-dependence.  I will explore this theme from 
a challenging angle – complexity – and within the purview of 
change driven by citizens.  In short, a major thrust is to inves-
tigate complexity as a ‘model’ to better reflect on bringing citi-
zens back into development as agents of their own change.  
The first step needed is to be clear about what is meant by 
‘complexity’.  This takes us into a short historical journey 
which involves debates about what science is all about.
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COMPLEXITY - PREPARING THE ANALYTIC 
GROUND
You can count the seeds in a fruit,  
but you cannot count the fruits in a seed. 
   African proverb
Like many innovations in ways of thinking about the world, 
complexity exhibits growing pains of clarity, confusion, resist-
ance and enthusiasm.  This part of the address focuses on two 
sources of difficulty in discussions about complexity in terms 
of substance, while Part III will look at application and useful-
ness.  Here, we first tackle the issue of complexity as a ‘sci-
ence’.  Then we clarify key vocabulary and language.  However, 
a necessary preliminary step is to introduce the bare bones of 
‘complexity’ in relation to society that are later dealt with in 
detail.
Though contested by some analysts (e.g., Mowles, et al, 2008) 
complexity is commonly described as a property of a system with 
a large number of elements or actors, such as people, interact-
ing in ways that do not allow for certainty about overall out-
comes at any moment in time or place.  Uncertainty has many 
roots.  One is the ‘emergence’ of unexpected conditions that 
cannot be anticipated by or reduced to the ‘addition’ of indi-
vidual interactions.  Another factor is contingencies affecting 
the process of interactions.  Yet another source of uncertainty 
is limits to what is known or knowable.3  These and other 
sources play out in alls aspects of life.  Yet, societies show that, 
to varying degrees, it is possible to cope with uncertainty.  This 
capacity is traced, amongst others, to human predispositions 
9and abilities, particularly through language, to self-organise 
(e.g., Waldrop, 1992).  
Such a human capability becomes ‘attracted’ towards the 
evolution of social configurations that help attain and retain 
stability.  They continue to do so as internal and external cir-
cumstances change and inter-penetrate each other.  Which 
configurations appear and when stem to a large degree from 
feedback as processes which co-determine if experiences of 
interacting are repeated, enhanced and become normative or 
are eventually discarded.  Human interaction requires energy. 
Consequently, rules, conventions and reliable patterns of rela-
tions which reduce transaction costs or energy ‘losses’ tend 
to gain favour.  In popular books and with media hype, com-
plexity is explained in a positive way as a dynamic responsive, 
adaptive and stabilizing attribute of societies that to greater 
or lesser degrees all teeter on the ‘edge of chaos’ of entropy-
driven forces of disorder and anarchy (Lewin, 1993).4  
The general point is that, compounding the vagaries of nature, 
uncertainty is inherent to the myriad connections between 
people as they go about their daily lives.  Complexity is a way 
of ‘labelling’ and understanding this social experience.  This 
does not mean that life is completely random or that change 
through human agency cannot be planned for or pursued. 
But it does mean that there are limits to what can be realis-
tically expected of putting plans into practice.  And, limits 
tend to grow as the scale of human agency and time horizon 
extend, which increases the demand for ongoing reappraisal 
and adjustment.  It also means that societies that (continually) 
reduce the costs of remaining stable are likely to do better 
for their constituents.  This ability is tied to gaining adequate 
conformity which, in turn, is premised on the acquisition, dis-
tribution and exercise of power, a factor developed later.  
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From this brief introduction of complexity, we can enter a dis-
cussion about its acceptance as a theory and, if so, of what?
Complexity as a Theory
Definitions of what is or is not a ‘scientific theory’ often 
revolve around differences of opinion about criteria related 
to what a ‘science’ should be able to do and how it should 
go about doing it.  The initial Newtonian, deterministic view 
of science was premised on immutable, universal laws with 
logical, reliable relations between cause and effect.  Initially, 
it worked well enough in defining three criteria for a ‘sci-
ence’, namely accurately and ‘truthfully’ describing, objectively 
explaining and accurately predicting phenomena based on rigor-
ous and repeatable methods of observation and measurement. 
Physics became a de facto normative role model.  
In this view, to qualify as a ‘science’ the most critical test of a 
body of knowledge and assumptions gained through rigorous 
observation is that of prediction associated with parsimony. 
This process and principle involve reduction of objects, phe-
nomenon and so on to their smallest constituent parts to bet-
ter identify their individual characteristics.  This step enables 
a search for a minimal number of assumptions in the laws 
operating on and between them.  Reductionism also permits 
generalisation to higher order, more encompassing, explana-
tions:  for example, that people’s behaviour can be explained 
in terms of preferences and economic utility.  Determinism - 
prediction with certainty - and reductionism –isolation of fun-
damental elements of a phenomenon – are defining features 
of a Newtonian logic which deeply inhabits a modern world 
view and values well as the social expectations and technolo-
gies it gives rise to.  
Since Newton, methods of physical measurement and observa-
tion improved.  In the early part of the last century, it appeared 
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that there was a predictive limit even within physics.  The 
Heisenberg principle of uncertainty and advances in theories 
of quantum mechanics ‘demonstrated that some phenomena 
are probabilistic’ leading some scholars “…to consider this 
a paradigm shift in the natural sciences” (Rihani and Geyer, 
2001:238).  However, a psychological aversion to acknowledg-
ing the role of chance or uncertainty in life and the ‘politics 
of promising a future’ obscure the significance of this shift for 
understanding the world.
It can be loosely argued that, as a scientific knowledge category 
and site of dedicated enquiry, complexity arose when the open-
ing of a non-deterministic window in physics combined with 
observations made by Edward Lorenz in prediction-analysis 
of weather as a dynamical physical system.  He was struck by 
the way that variations in weather are extremely sensitive to 
initial conditions and exhibited non-linear effects.  In systems 
with a mass of connections between elements, small changes 
can lead to unanticipated and major alterations in behaviour 
of the whole.
The advent of increasingly powerful computers enabled the 
myriad calculations involved in such analysis to be under-
taken, bringing with it screen visualisations and a popular-
ized notion of a ‘butterfly effect’ alluded to in the title of 
this address.5  In moving its wings, a butterfly causes minute 
changes in local air flow and pressure that may or may con-
tribute to (rapid) shifts in trajectory or scale of change in the 
weather experienced elsewhere at any time in the future.  The 
same physics holds true for the raising of a fist.  It is the poten-
tial for complexity to connect air displacement across the 
globe due to both natural and social processes that underlies 
the title of this presentation.
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As a distinct knowledge arena and intellectual preoccupation, 
complexity has ‘migrated’ from natural to social sciences. 
Such migrations, confront old and new debates about the 
‘transportability’ of theory, criteria, language and concepts 
from one to the other.  These debates require our notice in 
order to ‘relocate’ complexity from natural science origins.
The philosopher of science, Sir Karl Popper, examined the 
application of ‘naturalistic’ methods to social sciences.  He 
doubted that historical prophecy was a task of social science 
(1957:12).  And, he went on to argue that if the principle goal 
of ‘historicism’ in social science is to discern “…the ‘rhythms’, 
‘patterns’, ‘laws’ or ‘trends’ that underlie the evolution of 
human history in order to predict the course of the future” 
(ibid:3), its attempts will be flawed if ‘naturalistic’ methods, 
properly understood, are not applied (ibid:94).  He system-
atically addresses historicists’ arguments against applying 
natural science principles and methods of enquiry to social 
phenomena and theories.  Where methods of natural science 
enquiry are not in play to generate knowledge about social 
phenomenon, Popper argues for the use of terms such as ‘fore-
cast’ or ‘prophecy’ rather than prediction.  This permits for 
lack of precision and a degree of useful vagueness.
Since his writing, the terrain of social science has become pop-
ulated with contending theories and ‘post’ reactions to them. 
Much historicist argumentation criticised by Popper resonates 
with post-modernity, which stresses the temporal, spatial 
and cultural singularities of knowledge and truth.  What can 
be ‘objectively’ observed must be ‘subjectively’ interpreted. 
Multiple, local narratives generate knowledge – science has 
no monopoly and does not constitute all that is known or 
knowable.  Common within this analytic frame is a reaction 
against universalism of Western thought, accompanied by 
deconstruction of text to expose normative underpinnings. 
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Accompanying, but distinct from post-modernity, is a body 
of social science thinking driven by post-structuralism – an 
analytic school that accords greater value to human agency 
in creating and changing social relations and the meanings 
deeply embedded in acculturation.  Such reactions to modern-
ism and structuralism are themselves subject to criticisms 
that are beyond the scope of this paper to explore.6  The point 
is that they create the intellectual lattice underlying efforts to 
locate complexity as a theory.
Critical points of reference lie in contention over the nature 
and generation of knowledge; in the possibility of ‘objecti-
fication’ of enquiry where signifier and signified are inter-
dependent; in verifying the ‘truth’ of any description of social 
phenomenon; between linear-deterministic and non-linear, 
non-deterministic assumptions about social processes; and in 
disputes about methods of enquiry and the power inherent 
to them.  Stemming from a realist science perspective, Byrne 
argues that these contentions can be treated as explicitly 
dialectical: linear, reductionist origins are thesis and post-
modernity and post-structuralism are twinned antithesis, with 
complexity as synthesis (Byrne, 1998:45).  A dialectic dimen-
sion to social complexity is also identified by other analysts 
(e.g., Cole, 2003:331). 
Within this arena of propositions, conjectures and refuta-
tions, complexity analysis is seeing increasing application. 
Examples are to be found in the fields of economics (Anderson, 
et al, 1988; Beinhocker; 2006), organisation and management 
(Wheatley, 1994; Axelrod and Cohen, 2000), politics (Kollman, 
et al, 1993; Suteanu, 2005), knowledge generation and learning 
(Stacey, 2001; Surowiecki, 2004), public health (Sterman, 2006; 
Millstein, 2006), international relations and globalization 
(Cole, 2003; Chesters, 2004; Urry, 2005) and development stud-
ies (e.g., Rihani and Geyer, 2001; Rihani, 2003, 2005; Campbell, 
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et al, 2006; Ramalingam, et al, 2008; Mowles, et al, 2008). 
Implicit or explicit theoretical positions to be found in these 
works reflect the diversity and contentions sketched above, 
but all are connected by struggles to make practical sense of 
non-deterministic processes.  This commonality invites a theo-
retical proposition about complexity in its own right.
The roots and history of complexity thinking and application 
shows a pathway that evolves from but does not subsume pre-
ceding stages.  It starts from Heisenberg’s discovery of indeter-
minism in physics, moves through mathematical modelling 
of chaos, to non-deterministic properties of self-organisation 
exhibited in genetics and evolutionary biology, to understand-
ing non-linearity in social phenomenon and their change.  Each 
facet of ‘migration’ is concerned in some way with uncertainty 
of process outcomes.  This commonality points to a ‘predictive 
paradox’.  Complexity provides a theoretical grounding for 
better understanding, explaining and gauging limits to predic-
tion for solving social science problems.  By logical inversion, 
as a dialectic synthesis proposed by Byrne, complexity can be 
hypothesized as a theory of uncertainty in social processes.  This 
theorizing is gaining sociological ground in terms of the asym-
metric association between uncertainty and risk (e.g., Zinn, 
2008).  That which is uncertain is not necessarily risky.  But, 
what is risky always contains an element of uncertainty.  
For the present, it is sufficient to state that accurate prediction 
is not an attribute of complexity as an analytic lens.  But, I 
will argue, that what stands in the way of reliable predication 
is precisely what makes complexity worthy of ‘developmen-
tal’ attention.  A potential value of complexity as a theory of 
uncertainty could be found in (1) formulating enquiry with 
the ‘right’ level of parsimony and positioning between what 
is universal and what is particular or local.  This value can 
assist in (2) establishing meaningful boundaries and ques-
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tions within a ‘holistic’ appreciation of social processes.  Such 
a pragmatic location acknowledges that human agency is a 
critical, reflexive co-determinant in bringing change in society 
towards imagined futures.  But that there are constraints to 
action as well as limits to the certainty of attaining anticipated 
outcomes.  
“This is both more modest than a paradigm shift, 
or a shift between modern and post-modern sci-
ence, and yet more troubling because it starts to 
break the ways in which the positions of knower 
and known are constituted.  Rather than a shift in 
world-views, from a world of mechanical causes 
and effects to a world of complex instabilities, 
events and bifurcations, what counts as the right ques-
tion to ask, as the most relevant way of posing problems, 
changes.”  (Cilliers, 1998:48, emphasis added)
An ability to realise these potentials for and beyond aided-
development will depend, in part, on clarity about concepts 
and terminology.  
Transportability of Language
In keeping with other abstract concepts, communication 
about complexity requires clarity about meanings and their 
interpretation.  Popularization of the term makes this particu-
larly pertinent for complexity as a ‘transported’ concept.
“… Stengers asks: how can we use complexity 
without turning these ways of thinking into a 
world-view, that is, without feeling authorized to 
generalize?  The generalization of complexity into 
a world-view turns thought in circles on itself.  It 
becomes a movement that goes nowhere because it 
encounters no obstacles and takes no risks: ‘every-
thing is complex’”.  (MacKenzie, 2005:38)
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One part of a pathway to a solution is to precisely define com-
plex social phenomena by identifying distinctive attributes. 
Another is to compare it with other categories of social proc-
ess.  This sub-section concentrates on the former in relation to 
five properties associated with complex social systems driven 
by human agency (e.g., Cilliers, 1998:3-5 and 119-123).  Our 
purpose is to home in on terms that may be familiar in other 
contexts or less familiar but critical for understanding com-
plexity of society.  The terms are:  actor, emergence, attractor, 
recurrency and project.
Actors are people with a range of potentials and predispositions 
that guide their (in)action.  They operate under varied condi-
tions of capabilities and freedoms to undertake agency – that 
is:
“…the temporally constructed engagement by 
actors of different structural environments – the 
temporal-relational contexts of action – which, 
through the interplay of habit, imagination, and 
judgment both reproduces and transforms these 
structures in interactive response to the prob-
lems posed by changing historical situations”. 
(Emirbayer and Mishe, 1998:970)
In this view, agency is the interplay between: (1) past routine, 
experience and learning, energised by (2) images of a desired 
future situation, which is then (3) situationally-judged for 
achievability and risk, from which action may or may not be 
taken.  Inaction is also an action. 
Emergence is captured in the adage ‘the whole is more than the 
sum of the parts’.  It signals that something new or unexpect-
ed can arise when physical or social elements are combined. 
What emerges cannot be predicted from attributes of the ele-
ments concerned.  For example, properties of water – freezing, 
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flowing and steaming and an ability to put out fires –cannot 
be anticipated from the properties of hydrogen and oxygen as 
constituent parts.  In society, emergence is seen in features 
of life, for example, in the history of urbanization (Johnson, 
2001).  Over long history, networks of settlement and towns 
appear spontaneously, their shape and form determined by 
interplays between topography, demography, defence and 
economics long before ‘planning’.  What arises in time and 
place is a self-organised geographical hierarchy and provision 
of good and services.  A sort of natural (re)distributed speciali-
sation arises, which ebbs and flows with market forces fash-
ions and innovation in technology.  Low cost housing projects 
evolve from sought after homes into ghettos from which 
gangs and gang culture arise.  Emergence of the unexpected, 
the unanticipated, the unplanned is a distinctive feature of 
complexity in action.  In the image of John Casti (1994), com-
plexification is the ‘Science of Surprise’.  An explanation with 
careful observation and hindsight is often the best we can do 
to understand emergence.
An attractor has a particular meaning and role in complex sys-
tems.  As the name implies it has the effect of ‘pulling’ behav-
iour towards it.  Gravity as an all pervasive force is a natural 
science equivalent.  In social systems, an attractor’s effect is to 
‘guide’ people’s behaviour and interactions from which self-
generated patterns emerge.  A simple, single point attractor 
is, for example, a rubbish bin.  People with something to get 
rid of are ‘pulled’ towards it.  Another type of attractor is peri-
odic.  It is seen in a natural ‘search’ for interactions that, for 
example, reduce costs and expenditure of energy to achieve a 
particular outcome.  Optimizing a route taken as traffic condi-
tions unexpectedly alter reflects such an attractor.  Successful 
repetition builds confidence and trust, which reduces transac-
tion costs over time.7  This attractor gives rise to configura-
tions of personal economic relations that scale through to the 
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shaping of global markets.  Microscopic economic interactions 
give rise to macro-economic phenomena that, in turn, can 
affect the original micro-economic behaviour in a never end-
ing back and forth.  The virtual collapse of global banking is a 
recent example explored later.  
A third type of attractor is known as ‘strange’ in that it involves 
simple deterministic rules that, nevertheless, produce indeter-
minate results.  For example, the rules of tennis are clear.  But 
the results of a match are not known until it has been played. 
Each player learns from the play of the other and adapts his 
or her strategy accordingly.  But this process must be iterative 
in response to the response of the opponent, where slight dif-
ferences in play at different stages can give a distinctive edge 
or none at all.  In team sports, like football, the same iterative 
process is involved.  But added to the uncertainty mix are (abil-
ities of) cooperation between team members as well as compe-
tition with the opponents and the possibility of a draw (zero 
sum result) as well as win or lose.8  Seemingly straight forward 
transactions like shopping, or worshipping, or cooking or eat-
ing are played out in the daily life of six billion people every 
day.  But these simple acts are sociological events with attrac-
tors of, for example, status and control.  These attractor effects 
are seen in the conventions, (codified) rules and rituals they 
give rise to.  Strict adherence to conventions about food in the 
Indian caste system is one example, buying branded clothing 
in order to ‘belong’ to a group is another.  The presence of a 
sociological attractor is informed by recurrency. 
Recurrency is a looping back of experience of transactions in 
ways that reinforce (positive) or attenuate (negative) transac-
tion decisions next time around.  Feedback is a critical factor 
in self-regulation.  Depending on feedback, social systems can 
become highly unstable. Until blocked by international action, 
positive feedback in the value of blood diamonds helped feed 
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and sustain wars in West Africa.  But blocking feedback can 
keep societies stuck in conditions that reduce ‘fitness’ as the 
environment alters.  An example is autocratic politics that 
deny access to information or giving voice which can stifle an 
ability to change.  Feedback can also help society to adjust by 
iteratively feeding information about the environment into 
the system as well as information about results of the system’s 
action on the environment.  Mass media can function in this 
way.
Projects cast something forward.  This can be in real time, such 
as projecting an image on a screen, or, in psychology, attrib-
uting features of self and values onto another.  Reflecting 
post-modern analysts, this is an inherent and dangerous fea-
ture of post-colonial cross-cultural relations critiqued in the 
Orientalism of Edward Said (1994).  As alluded to previously, 
‘political projects’ are comprehensive images of what a society 
should become and how to get there.  The scales of time and 
effort are typically large, frequently with processes that are 
conflictual and contested.  In development work, projects are 
often the basic unit of a problem-solving programme or inter-
vention.  They are constructed as time+resource+activity+actor 
bound packages, designed on the basis of achieving pre-
defined results resting on a Newtonian logic.  Uncertainty is 
assigned to an assessment of the criticality of assumptions and 
estimates of risk.  But the latter are seldom realistically framed 
as this would reduce the potential for financing.  Projects of 
this type are most amenable to localised, small scale, short-
term changes in physical conditions.  A fourth understand-
ing of a ‘project’ is found in human agency.  People establish 
individual and collective ‘projects’ to achieve the futures they 
imagine and aspire to.  With these comparisons, it is obviously 
important to be clear about which view of a project is in play.
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This section established complexity as a body of knowledge 
and ideas offering a dialectic synthesis of contending social 
theories.  It also set out key terms and vocabularies.  From this 
grounding it is now possible to move forwards into what this 
conceptual framework might mean for analysing and under-
standing society. 
III
COMPLEXITY AND SOCIETY
“The first step to the understanding of men is the bringing to con-
sciousness of the model or models that dominate and penetrate 
thought and action.”
      Isaiah Berlin9
As noted above, complexity is being applied in many areas of 
social activity.  Politics, management, economics and many 
other fields are now being looked at through a complexity lens. 
In common is their treatment of society as a model known as a 
complex adaptive system (CAS).  What this means is described 
in detail because of its importance as a point of reference for 
application to aided change.  The approach is to, first, summa-
rise what a CAS looks like in terms of defining characteristics. 
It then draws on and critiques ‘clarifying’ comparisons made 
between simple, complicated, complex and chaotic condi-
tions based on more or less clear relations between causes and 
effects.  My basic argument is that comparisons employed rely 
on examples and analogies that conflate natural science and 
social science processes that need to be pulled apart.  Once this 
is done, there should be less confusion about taking a complex 
view of development as a social undertaking.
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Society as a Complex Adaptive System
“A family of nonlinear systems attracted the atten-
tions of scholars as potentially useful tools in 
analysing natural and social phenomena.  They 
are variously described as being complex, because 
they have numerous internal elements; dynamic 
because their behaviour is governed by local inter-
actions between the elements; and dissipative, 
because they have to consume energy to avoid 
drifting from self-organization into chaos.  When 
such systems are capable of evolution they are also 
known as Complex Adaptive Systems.”  (Rihani and 
Geyer, 2001:239)
Paul Cilliers provides a list of the major characteristics of com-
plex adaptive systems, then illustrated in relation to people 
as economic agents (1998:3-7).  The primary features he high-
lights can be condensed and summarized as follows.
A complex system is made up of a 1. large number of elements 
that interact in a dynamic way what does not necessarily 
require physical contact: information transfer can also be 
in play.
Interactions are fairly extensive – 2. elements are influenced by 
many others.
Interactions have particular pre-requisite characteristics 3. 
in being:  non-linear – small changes can have dispropor-
tionately large effects and visa versa; and act over a short 
range, albeit subject to more distant influences that can 
be modulated, that is amplified, suppressed or altered in 
various ways.
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There is recurrency, or positive and negative 4. feedback 
between the elements – both are required- that can operate 
directly or via intervening stages.
Complex systems are typically open5.  - in other words they are in 
interaction with a wider environment – where boundary 
setting, or framing – is usually determined by the descrip-
tion, or purpose of the system of interest. 
Complex systems operate 6. far from equilibrium with a con-
stant flow of energy to ensure survival.  “Equilibrium is 
another word for death.”  Asymmetry within and between 
elements is a defining feature.  
The past is co-responsible for present behaviour: 7. time is a 
critical dimension of in a diachronic process that continu-
ally contains prior history in any current state.
Behaviour of the whole of the system is not ‘known’ to any 8. 
individual element and its structure is the emergence of 
complexity from dynamical patterns of interaction between 
the elements.
Together, these features generate the propensity for self-organ-
isation distinctive to human history.  The potential power of a 
complexity lens stems from its ability to generate knowledge 
about what is involved.  While some features may be familiar, 
such a technical description is often difficult to comprehend 
and envisage in daily life.  In addition, using this sort of list 
depends on the ‘distance’ one takes, i.e., the level or scale in 
play and amount of detail required.  One way of providing 
practical clarity is to compare complexity with other types of 
process shown below.
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Understanding Complexity by Comparison
Comparison is often a powerful way of examining a topic. 
However, here I will argue that comparisons employed to bet-
ter understand complexity are ‘helpfully misleading’.  Real life 
examples are useful, but can be misleading if the comparisons 
are not like-with-like.  This is a natural danger when both natu-
ral science and social science are in play and complexity is said 
to be a paradigmatic breakthrough or ‘unifier’ of this schism 
(e.g., Lewin, 1993).  This point is illustrated through two exam-
ples from current literature.
Table 1., is a step towards clarification by comparison.  In this 
type of analysis, what is considered to be complex is positioned 
in relation to other types of systems with interactions prem-
ised on different cause-effect relationships.  The abstraction/
reductionism involved in this form of clarification can be 
applied to both natural and social systems.  
However, unless like is compared with like, problems can arise 
when clarification is made concrete by using practical cases. 
An example is to be seen in Table 2., which, for our purposes, 
does not require chaos as an interaction type.
Columns one and two illustrate a mechanical/Newtonian 
optic on complexity.  In a clear distinction, the example in 
column three is decidedly sociological.  Complexity, as theory 
of uncertainty in sociological processes requires consistent 
non-deterministic comparisons.  Using the same problems, 
Table 3., does so.
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The point is that, from an actor perspective, uncertainty in 
some form or other remains to some degree.  Each typology 
contains complex elements.  So, while a comparative categori-
zation can be helpful in understanding complexity in action, 
it is important not to (inadvertently) range across natural and 
sociological examples in doing so.  Otherwise, there is a danger 
of complexity becoming the theory of everything.
A similar comparative approach to locate and understand 
complexity, but with a cognitive point of entry, is provided 
by the Cynefin Framework (Snowden and Boone, 2007).  Here, 
an actor’s ‘reading’ of the context, problem and solutions 
are central.  The anticipation is that with this type of under-
standing problems can be better delineated and appropriate 
interventions and management methods can be applied.  This 
modelling rests on ‘multi-ontological sense making’ (Snowden 
2005).  
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More simply put, what needs to be appreciated in a particular 
situation and problem-setting has many origins and points 
of reference.  Each is useful in its own right.  However, they 
must be carefully combined in relation to different degrees of 
complexity in terms of the (non-) linearity of cause and effect 
relationships in play.
In this sense, complexity also applies to what are perceived 
to be simple or complicated processes, which is confused by 
Cynefin’s diagrammatic representation.  It implies that there 
is a separation between the three.  But complexity theory is 
built on the observation that much that is simple and rela-
tively certain can build up and interact in ways that lead to 
emergent processes and institutions that introduce greater 
uncertainty.  The recent banking collapse is illustrative.  
It all started with people putting money in banks that were 
sustained by lending it out with interest.  From this simple 
principle emerged the – now dead or dying - non-deposit hold-
ing investment banks and ‘self-regulated’ financial markets. 
In the process, dependency became reversed.  The bank did not 
‘need’ people’s money to make money.  But society as a whole 
needed the financial system to work because it had become 
‘too big to fail’.  Sophisticated and complicated instruments, 
like collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), obscured debt 
and entangled inter-bank relationships into complex connec-
tions with hidden risks.  This condition brought the whole to 
the edge of collapse with the potential to trigger social and 
political chaos.  Simple, mechanised money transactions were 
connected and nested within tiers of inter-dependent relation-
ships and not immune from their behaviour.
In this case, using the eight characteristics described above, 
a brief, illustrative complexity analysis would point to uncer-
tainty to the edge of collapse stemming from:
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Information:1.   Poorly understood and wilfully obscured infor-
mation about the risk being transported between multiple, 
widely distributed agents, abetted by conflicts of interest 
within rating agencies. 
Influences:2.   Reliance on pumped-up assumptions about 
levels of economic growth in the recent past supporting 
increases in house prices.
Range of action:3.   Myriad local loan transactions based on 
lax lending conditions and volume-sale incentives for sales 
staff.
Recurrency:4.   Positive feedback for more borrowing through 
continued reduction in Federal Bank interest rates, rein-
forcing pressure to re-mortgage and take on more debt.
Openness:5.   Connections between China and India’s high 
rates of saving which finance the growing US deficit that 
rely on continuation of American consumer purchasing 
power.
Equilibrium:6.   Gross asymmetry between the real economy 
and the highly ‘leveraged’ financial economy.  For example, 
the ratio of equity to assets of investment bank Goldman 
Sachs was a staggering 1:2,325,580.10
History:7.   Over-optimism about continuation of some twenty 
years of positive economic growth in developed economies 
and the emergence of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and 
China) as new motors sustaining the process.
Site of “knowing’:8.   Fragmentation of knowledge across nation 
states about the real situation, in part due to a politics of 
‘light’ regulation that generated insufficient information 
about what was going on.
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In the banking system case, each supposed certainty and 
sophisticated calculation of risk contained uncertainties that 
come to light in the cold reality of impending disintegration 
of the whole.  
This brief review suggests that a complex framework has diag-
nostic and, hence, remedial potential for understanding and 
being better equipped to address the continually changing 
landscape of social problems.  This is the calling and task of 
aided-development.  And, we are now at a stage where a start 
can be made to viewing the international development co-
operation through a complexity lens.
IV
COMPLEXITY AND AIDED DEVELOPMENT
‘Vol vuur hamerde de minister op zijn laatste punt: effec-
tiviteit. “Waar we succes hebben gaan we door, anders 
stoppen we.” Meteen daarna gevolgd door de nuance: 
´Maar we moeten dit wel zorgvuldig meten, met oog voor 
de complexiteit, externe factoren en de lange termijn. 
Anders doen we onszelf te kort, maar nog erger, dan doen 
we de mensen tekort die onze solidariteit verdienen.´”11
Bert Koenders, Minister of Dutch Development 
Cooperation
[Full of fire, the Minister hammered home his last 
point:  effectiveness. ‘Where we are successful will 
be continued, otherwise we stop.’  Immediately fol-
lowed by the nuance:  ‘But we need to measure this 
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with care, with our eye on complexity, external 
factors and the long term.  To do otherwise would 
be an injustice to ourselves, but, even worse, an 
injustice to those who deserve our solidarity.]
Viewing the development industry through a complexity lens 
faces a number of problems.  One is schizophrenia about politi-
cally demanded predictability on the one hand and the empiri-
cal truth about uncertainty in aided-development work on the 
other.  This tension is reflected in the quotation.  Another is 
the general reluctance to take on board a new way of thinking 
about development work until its acceptance can no longer be 
avoided.  This address is, hopefully, one step in this direction. 
I start with why, as a recognised way of analysing other social 
phenomena, complexity has made little headway in the aid 
fraternity.  Analysis suggests ways of tackling the obstacles 
involved.  These include being honest about contentions 
between the growing number of people concerned about the 
topic and the, potentially confusing, perspectives they bring. 
A modest, pragmatic way forward is proposed that introduces 
complexity as a model of thinking about social change and not 
a wholesale paradigm shift that logic would imply.  
With this cautionary backdrop, reflection turns to the state of 
play in relation to debates about aid.  This provides an entry 
to a necessary description of aid as a distinct system that can 
be analysed using complexity theory.  This is illustrated in 
familiar terms of development sectors.  Part V takes us to a 
substantive discussion on civic society and civic driven change 
with examples that exhibit civic agency in terms of citizen’s 
influencing state functioning and power.  
Introducing Complexity to Development Discourse
With others, Samir Rihani (2001; 2005) has been promoting 
the notion of a paradigm shift in development aid with com-
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plexity as a more appropriate framework.  He has encountered 
a number of problems in doing so.  One is:
“the natural and wholly justified, reluctance of 
scholars and practitioners to accept a move from 
one formulation that has prevailed for several 
decades to another.  Shift on this scale takes place 
only after it has become abundantly clear that 
the current ideas have failed to answer too many 
fundamental questions or that they have unargu-
ably failed to deliver consistently adequate results.  
Few would now claim that the prevailing beliefs 
and practices have worked satisfactorily.” (Rihani, 
2005:54)
A second, and more critical problem is that, even if there is 
enough dissatisfaction with performance, there is no reason, 
a priori, why complexity would be the best alternative.  And, 
even if this was demonstrated, his analysis of geo-political 
considerations mitigate against changing a set up that has 
served donor countries well enough.  For, the real measures 
of performance of the existing, model of aided development 
lie elsewhere.  In addition, a lot of institutional and personal 
capital has been invested in current arrangements generating 
a resistance that would be hard to overcome.
In this scenario, what strategies are most appropriate to 
engage the development community in critical reflection on 
complexity as a better explanation for aid performance and 
its improvement?  For Rihani, the answer lies in increasing 
the forces stemming from rising dissatisfaction from within 
the community itself.  These forces both feed and benefit from 
a climate for transformation arising from pronouncements by 
public figures and intellectuals, such as Nobel prize winner 
Joseph Stiglitz.  In other words, while external challenges to 
32
aid performance which question its very assumptions about 
social change can help, strategy requires:
 “… an equally robust technical, hopefully scien-
tific, justification for adopting a different model” 
(Rihani, 2005:60).  
One agenda before us, therefore, is to increase the evidence 
base from which complexity theory, analysis and practical 
development action can be assessed.  
A related agenda is to openly address differences of opinion 
about how complexity should be treated and communicated 
to doubtful audiences.  The issue hinges, in part on whether 
or not complexity is best regarded as a system or as a pattern 
of social configurations.  It also features in if and how the 
insights and knowledge gained through complexity analysis 
can be ‘used’.  The two issues interweave.
Chris Mowles refers to three camps or schools of thought 
among those engaged with linking complexity and develop-
ment.12  The ‘utilitarian’ camp pursues the debate from the 
angle of practical application.  Insights from complexity 
theory - such as rules – are to be ‘unleashed’ on, for example, 
an organisation.  This approach is simply inconsistent with 
the non-deterministic essence of complexity that cannot be 
instrumentalised in such a way.  The second school relies 
on computation to model how social phenomena arise and 
can be explained, forgoing any pretension to prediction.  The 
third school does not start from a ‘holistic’ systems perspective 
theory.  Instead, this school relies on anthroposophic ground-
ings from which patterns of human interaction derive from 
primary interactions between individuals.  In this view “…the 
insights from theories of complexity offer similar explanations 
to those forged by a generation of philosophers and sociolo-
gists such as Norbert Elias, Pierre Bourdieu and the American 
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pragmatists …”13  But complex adaptive systems are not an 
appropriate framing for explanations of what is observed, 
patterns are to be preferred.  In this analysis he is argued to 
apparently ignore a fourth camp.  That is people:
 “… who think that some ideas about complex-
ity provide interesting analogies to imagine other 
ways of being and working, and that these don’t 
equate to trying to ‘control’ a future but to try 
and role with the punches in ways that are more 
respectful of the ebb and flow of change.”14
Contention in perspective between agent-centric and systems 
approaches to human interactions influence the understand-
ing and interpretation of social phenomena, for example, 
the nature, evolution, function and reform of institutions 
(Woodhill, 2008).15  The positions of each camp pivot on a 
dispute about the notion that society can be ‘engineered’ that 
is implicit in aided-development, in post-conflict reconstruc-
tion and in politics and public policy more widely.  It would 
be unfortunate for rethinking aided-change if this dispute is 
either ignored or relied on as an excuse not to engage in seri-
ous debate.
Explained in more detail elsewhere (Fowler, 2007b), from the 
perspective of social analysis and problem-solving, the attribu-
tion of all social phenomenon to individual agency is exces-
sively reductionist and self-limiting.  It appears to rely on an 
interpretation of the formation of habitus that is immune from 
the inescapable and enduring force of entropy that is part 
and parcel of everyday human and social life (e.g., Hokikian, 
2002).  Entropy operates as a strange attractor that cannot be 
ignored.  In other words, natural ‘deterministic’ drivers must 
be included as enduring human dispositions.  Without this fea-
ture, primacy of agency does not, itself, offer a driver for the 
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expenditure of energy to establish and sustain self-organised 
configurations that are reflexive, dialectic and never stable.
Responding to the never-ending demand for configuration 
under complex conditions of uncertainty drives a social-
adaptive imperative to gain maximum stability at minimum 
(energy) cost.  Because all complexities cannot be grasped by 
one individual alone, institutions arise as a significant way of 
satisfying this imperative.  Put another way, there is a selec-
tive-adaptive pressure to achieve and maintain social arrange-
ments that call for compliant behaviour, but with minimum 
collective effort.  One outcome of this necessity is an evolution 
of hierarchies of power distributions, rules and arrangements 
that are embedded in all human transactions, with trust as 
a critical variable.  Bourdieu argues that gaining compliance 
with the existing order by influencing people’s dispositions16 
within an individual’s habitus is an ‘invisible’, cost-effective 
method of gaining compliance (Navarro, 2007).  This ability is 
followed by control over language and knowledge; by deter-
mination of pubic agendas and participants; and by physical 
coercion (Lyotard, 1984; Lukes, 2005; Haugaard, 1997).  It is 
these features of power relations between citizens and a state 
that civic agency must contend with.
In my view, a ‘complexity as a system’ model is to be preferred. 
Reasons for doing so are theoretical groundings which: (1) dia-
lectically connect people to the natural world that they stem 
from and interdependently rely on; (2) provide for multi-dis-
ciplinary interpretations of social phenomenon; and (3) offer 
a coherent set of analytic and knowledge categories to help 
gauge what is appropriate reductionism and questioning for 
the issue at hand.  Agency that imagines, strives and plans for 
a desired future is not marginalised or discounted, but uncer-
tainty about attainment is central to description, explanation 
and interpretation.
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In sum, communicating about complexity and development 
must, indeed, heed cautions about the inherent contradiction 
of instrumentalism.  But one must not throw the child away 
with the bath water by ignoring its value in understanding the 
uncertainties that people have, must be aware of and struggle 
to overcome if they are to be agents of their own change.  What 
this means in practice is explored by illustrative application of 
complexity to development.  
Aid as a System
The quotation of the Minister above reflects disputes between 
recent publications on international aid (Sachs, 2005; Easterly, 
2006; Collier, 2007).  These texts signal disagreement about if 
and how poverty reduction can best be accomplished by aid. 
However, they exhibit no contention about the necessity for 
economic growth with a liberal prescription.  An interesting 
comparison lies in the extent to which these authors assume 
and apply natural or social science paradigms to their analy-
sis and confidence in making predictions.  The Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) probably epitomise the Jeffery 
Sachs’ – subject to adequate resources – plannable and man-
ageable high predictability end of the spectrum.  William 
Easterly’s searchers and innovative processes are at the other 
extreme where indeterminism is to be found and worked with 
(in a market-based way).  This span across analyses stemming 
from natural and social science theories suggests an oppor-
tunity for complexity to demonstrate its value in rethinking 
aided-development.  
The development industry is a particular system with distinct 
features, located within a wider system of international rela-
tions and instruments of defence and diplomacy that are 
explored elsewhere (Stewart, 2004; Fowler, 2007a).  Following 
Cilliers’ observations (1998:5), complexity analysis requires a 
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system description to sets appropriate boundaries and locate 
the issues and questions.  What does the aid system look like?
Official international development assistance operates on the 
basis of relations between supposedly sovereign nation states.17 
Its ostensible purpose is to accelerate and direct change in soci-
ety in ways that reduce the incidence of poverty and exclusion, 
while improving governance towards greater democracy.  The 
observed reality is that sites where these objectives are most 
relevant and critical are not strongly correlated with where 
aid is actually allocated between countries (Alisina and Dollar, 
2002; Easterly and Pfutze, 2008; Wood, 2008).  It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to delve into this inconsistency, but suf-
ficient to recognise that there is a link into a wider system of 
geo-political and institutional interests that penetrates the aid 
system boundary.
As a system of resource transfer, relationships and processes, 
aid can be characterised in the following ways.18
Is driven by a ‘deficit of capital’ premise generating an • 
imperative to disburse funds and provide technical exper-
tise.
Follows and applies linear, prescriptive deterministic • 
methods.
Has a success rate estimated at around sixty percent for • 
disbursements at completion, but with doubt about sus-
tainability of change thereafter.
Is trying to improve performance by increasingly applying • 
competitive market principles.
Is highly political but projects an apolitical (econometric) • 
technocracy.
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Generates and operates with a sequence of power asym-• 
metries along an allocation-disbursement chain from 
donor to intended recipient.
Is populated by a diverse array of organisational actors • 
with a corresponding plethora of self-interests, owners and 
measures of success which make collaboration difficult.
Exhibits feedback mechanisms, such as evaluation, that • 
seldom translate into accountability for (not improving) 
performance or applied in adjustment to country alloca-
tion decisions.19
Learns and improves incrementally, but with susceptibility • 
to ‘fashion’ changes in policy.
Is connected through formal institutional arrangements • 
that do not produce co-ordination between major national 
players that can simply opt out if they disagree.20  
Engenders resistance amongst those with lesser power that • 
can emerge as pathologies.21 
These features and history of performance, offer more than 
enough evidence to suggest that that world and national 
development has been misunderstood and mislabelled.  It is 
not an inexorable, linear, deterministic process where chance, 
for example, plays an insignificant role.  Yet the mislabelled 
model – which holds vicariously for donor countries – is held 
up as the process that others will inevitably follow, aided or 
not.22  
From a more limited standpoint of ‘complexity as theory of 
uncertainty of social process’ at issue is the extent to which 
the aid system could be reformed and improved by recognis-
ing, understanding, systematically analysing and bringing 
uncertainty into its theory and practices.  Not as an instru-
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ment to improve prediction, but as a framework of observa-
tion, categories and thinking that enhance the human and 
institutional capabilities and resilience needed to be sensitive 
and respond to uncertainties as they unfold.  
The next section discusses what might this look like in terms 
of major sectors of aid intervention.
Adopting a Complexity Approach to Aid Programmes
The analysis so far points to a different way of thinking and 
gaining awareness about aided-development.  It presents a 
challenge to identify and better contend with the uncertain-
ties of social change.  What this means depends on many 
things, particularly the scale involved.  To set the scene for 
applying complexity to the aid system, I start with an exercise 
which introduces an uncertainty lens to typical sectors consid-
ered critical for aided-change:  health, education, agriculture 
and governance.  Table 4., illustrates the degree of uncertainty 
faced in aid as the scale of the issue increases and is fed by 
uncertainties at lower levels.  Sources of uncertainty change 
as scale increases.
For example, the efficiency of higher education depends on 
the way entry selection is carried out, a new variable on top of 
the uncertainties about the quality of pre-university teaching 
or of examinations.  Similarly, health education to prevent 
malaria – use of treated bed nets, draining stagnant water and 
so on – do not cope with drug resistance when people do not 
follow treatment regimes, even when preventive measures 
succeed in reducing the overall incidence.  Economic and 
cultural factors associated with drug access and use introduce 
types of uncertainty that make prevention of drug resistance 
more complex than a bio-medical problem. 
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Table 4.  Uncertainty in aid sectors
Degree of Process Uncertainty
Aided 
Sector
Low
(Simple)
Medium
(Complicated)
High
(Complex)
Health
Hygienic 
behaviour 
reduces incidence 
of illness
Effective 
education for 
public health 
Prevention of 
risk behaviour 
in HIV/AIDS
Education Text books can give information
Efficacy of 
teacher-learner 
interaction
Gaining 
effectiveness 
in higher 
education
Agriculture Farmer sensitivityto risk
Establishing farm
gate prices
Ensuring 
minimum 
calorie intake 
for all
Governance Votes can be counted Voter eligibility
Elections give 
legitimacy
Again, bearing in mind cautions about naïve utilitarianism, 
the general point is that analyses of uncertainties can reveal 
connections and features affecting change.  For example, 
robust democracy depends on substantive certainty about the 
probity of the electoral mechanics, but calls for substantive 
uncertainty about the outcome in terms of who wins.  If the 
result is foregone, why vote?  In this paradoxical sense, uncer-
tainty is a desired property of a sound political process.23  In 
other words, uncertainty is not, necessarily, undesirable.  Such 
insights can lead to different types of questions and more 
realism about what can be anticipated from directed effort at, 
for example, governance.  Obviously, much work needs to be 
done to critically examine a complexity approach to rethink-
ing aided-change at the practical funding level of projects and 
programmes.  
It is now time to return to the starting square of this presenta-
tion, applying a complexity lens to civic agency.  Specifically, I 
will look at agency that seeks to increase a polities’ influence 
on, if not control over, political authority. 
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V
COMPLEXITY AND CIVIC AGENCY
The origin of this professorial appointment lies in a long 
career, much of which has revolved around NGO-ism, now 
recast in the mould of civil society.  As some of you may be 
aware, a recent venture in this field was, together with Kees 
Biekart and others, to identify a narrative of development in 
society that is not premised on states or markets but stems 
from the agency of citizens.  The results of this work on civic 
driven change (CDC) were made public in October as a start to 
wider debate in the months to come.24
The focus on CDC allows me to explain the concept but side-
step discussions on what is or is not civil society and what is 
in and out of this category, a debate occupies many studies 
(e.g., Hodgkinson and Foley, 2003; Heinrich, 2007) and confer-
ences.  It also allows for concentration on self-organisation as 
a distinctive feature of and within societies.  
This part of the address starts with a brief introduction to civic 
agency understood as civic driven change.  Then a complexity 
perspective is applied to civic driven change within different 
contexts and with different intentions.  The examples are 
chosen to illustrate that civic agency is not simply located in 
a civil society of non-profit associations as modelled by the 
aid system.  Nor is it something necessarily orchestrated from 
above.  The examples draw on self-organisation driven by civic 
agency of Chinese farmers and of activists in the recent US 
presidential campaign of Barack Obama.
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Civic Driven Change
The notion of agency has been previously defined.  What makes 
agency ‘civic’ are particular values attached to citizenship as a 
rights-based relationship with a state.25  Civic behaviour is pro-
social.  It involves respect for differences between people and 
a concern for the whole “…that pushes society towards a world 
order in which people behave as permanent guests of each 
other and of the natural environment.” (Fowler and Biekart, 
2008:174)  
As an attribute associated with citizenship, civic agency is 
not located within a particular institutional domain, such as 
government, market, civil society or family.  Citizens in any 
walk of life can act in civic or uncivic ways affecting the whole 
through processes involving, for example, the spread of infor-
mation and ripple effects of personal interaction.  Local volun-
teerism for the public good is an expression of civility that can 
act as an example for others both near and afar.  Gangsterism 
and street warfare to control territory to sell illegal drugs can 
propagate a general sense of fear beyond immediate borders. 
When the right to have rights is respected, a long-term effect 
of civic agency is to orient a political order in ways that respect 
inclusion and tolerance of differences between social groups. 
Typically, this stabilizing condition becomes operational 
through contention, struggle, cooperation and negotiation to 
arrive at some form of democratic political dispensation.  This 
arrangement selects, endorses and periodically modifies the 
political project, or collective future, of which people are part. 
However:
“When progress – the realization of people’s emerg-
ing social potentials – and deeper complexity is sty-
mied by anachronistic social institutions preserv-
ing extant vested interests the disadvantaged have 
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to organise themselves to effect progressive social 
change.”  (Cole, 2003:336)
This quotation takes us back to the notion that civic agency 
contains the dialectic of compliance and resistance to the 
established order.  Citizens can bow as well as raise their 
fists towards authority.  The issue is under what conditions 
does the latter occur and what does this mean for support by 
external agencies whose agendas often call for the realization 
of the potentials of all people?  A complexity-based answer 
would have to start with the citizen as actor, with civic agency 
as a possible act and with aid as an influence penetrating 
from the external environment.  The next section adopts this 
approach.
Complexity and Civic Agency
I noted previously that a significant weakness of the aid sys-
tem is an inability to embody change by those whose lives 
are central to the story of sustainable development.  Despite 
an enduring people-centred rhetoric and call for local owner-
ship, this enduring problem stems, amongst others, from the 
paradoxical ‘tyranny of participation’ (Cleaver, 1999).  This, 
often ritualised, development practice is allied to the limited 
incentives for and reticence of institutions to cede power and 
control until public action leaves little alternative.  
I would argue that complexity prompts different questions 
and interpretations with a potential to better understand and 
tackle this systemic weakness.  There are three-fold reasons for 
this expectation.  First, complexity is firmly actor/transaction 
dependent.  It forces analysis to start with the life world of the 
agents concerned in a far more fundamental way than iden-
tifying deficits or needs or taking part in planning exercises 
and the implementation of aided projects.  Second, the focus 
on uncertainty provides a distinct optic into existing tiers of 
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social arrangements, the power transmitted through connec-
tions and the reactions involved:  compliance or resistance or, 
...?  Third, uncertainty is sensitive to the profile and appraisal 
of risk that an agent experiences, would anticipate and fac-
tor into their decision making about (in)action.  Risk aversion 
must be well understood by ‘outsiders’ advocating and propa-
gating aided-change for others (Rai, 2008).
To understand a situation, a complexity perspective of civic 
agency would ask the following sort of questions.  
What uncertainties are being coped with by whom and in 
what ways?  
What forms of self-organisation and connections with the 
wider environment make this possible?
What uncertainties carry most risk?  
What role does uncertainty play in people conforming 
within the existing order?  
What action could be considered and negotiated to enhance 
individual and collective abilities to reduce and better 
cope with uncertainty?  
Respecting answers to these questions and then working from 
them would imply a departure from common ‘participatory’ 
practice:  a model which operates from and requires conform-
ity with the ‘certainty’ parameters of the aid system sketched 
previously.  It may be agent oriented, but it is not agent-based 
in the full meaning of the term.
Two brief cases can illustrate what complexity applied to civic 
agency can look like from two very different contexts and 
pursuit of political projects that involve greater citizen influ-
ence.
The first example is of mass complex civic agency in China.  It 
is provided by Zhichang Zhu’s study of the rise and power of 
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Household Farms (HF) and Township Village Enterprises (TVE). 
He argues that the transformation of China’s rural economy 
brought about by these peasant initiatives cannot be adequate-
ly explained by prevailing institutional theories derived from 
and blinkered by analogy with Western experience.26 
“But who created HF and TVE, and how?  ….  HF 
and TVE were not built by Deng Xiaoping and his 
coalition at the centre.  China’s then ruling elites, 
the shining few, at best tolerated and acquiesced 
HF and TVE, only after it became painfully clear 
that the two ugly-duck institutions had uncontrol-
lably grown up and that the Party-state could no 
longer do without accepting the vital benefits they 
produced.  HF and TVE were not built by conscious-
ly organised ‘collectives’ either.  There were no 
theorised models or slogans, no mass gatherings 
or boardroom meetings, no appointed, selected 
or self-claimed leaders/activists, let alone formal 
organisations to design and promote HF and TVE.  
Rather, documented evidence reveals that HF and 
TVE were created chiefly by millions of unknown 
farmers via a massive movement, a quiet revolu-
tion that is spontaneous, unorganised, leaderless, 
non-ideological and apolitical.” (Zhu, 2008:1)
He shows how uncertainties, fears and risks about self-initiat-
ed collaborative action within the context of an authoritarian 
regime where minimalised and countered.  Through trial and 
error, this was achieved through, amongst others:  secret test-
ing of farming arrangements disapproved of by the Party; wil-
ful misconstruing of policies; misrepresentation of emerging, 
forbidden productive entities as approved types; corrupting 
party cadres; and, simply cheating on costs, prices and mar-
kets.  His analysis goes on to demonstrate many characteristics 
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of HF and TVE as complex adaptive systems within a larger sys-
tem – the state - that itself adapted.  This case does not reflect 
a site or model of civic action expected by developmentalism. 
Yet, the spontaneous ability of citizens to exert significant 
influence on a non-democratic state should not be discounted 
because of this.  
A very different illustration come from the United States of 
America where plural democracy has tested its limits in terms 
of the efficacy of political parties to ensure that the polity at 
large controls those in authority.  Harry Boyte (2008), shows 
how increasing uncertainty about the probity of the political 
system provoked citizen driven self-organization at the cost of 
party-political mobilization and control by incumbent elites. 
This phenomenon is recently seen in Barack Obama’s elec-
tion strategy.  A mass of volunteers outside of the traditional 
Democratic Party machine, used electronic connectivity for 
fund raising, information exchange and agenda engagement. 
Again, many elements of complexity and uncertainty were in 
play.  Interactions were large scale via the web.  Thousands of 
trained volunteers acted at a short range with potential voters. 
Low-cost multi-directional information flows gave real-time 
communication about events and positions.  Feedback was 
seen in rapid and adaptive reaction to the rival’s campaign 
and its (negative/demonic) advertising.  A large financial asym-
metry emerged between candidates because of a strategy of 
mass fundraising with small amounts.  Sensitivity remained 
with the wider environment, such as policy engagement in the 
banking collapse.  Finally, was the significance of historic sym-
bolism in the candidacy of an African-American.  Despite all 
these uncertainty reducing choices, the result was uncertain 
to the last.  Lasting effects of an Obama constituency outside 
of the Democratic Party hierarchy remain to be seen.
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What these and a growing number of cases (e.g., Mathie 
and Cunningham, 2008) help communicate is that complex-
ity is sensitive to agent-based processes within socio-political 
configurations that constrain or try to control civic influ-
ence.  A related message is that civic agency can be instigated 
from many institutional locations if agents wish to do so. 
Consequently, it will be important for the aid system to reflect 
on how multi-locational civic agency can complement, if not 
replace, a current preoccupation with civil society.
V
CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS
For me, the case for viewing and doing development through a 
complexity lens rests on five arguments or propositions.  First, 
there is ample evidence that linear-based aid is not effective 
enough.  While incremental change may improve things, they 
will not fix the deeper factors involved.  Complexity offers a 
well-grounded alternative perspective of social change, show-
ing greater correspondence with the observed reality of uncer-
tainty in development work. 
A second argument stems from the centrality of self-organisa-
tion in complexity thinking and analysis of change at different 
scales.  Complexity offers a potential for a deeper understand-
ing of people’s collective agency than the externally modelled 
‘capacity building’ impositions currently on offer, which tend 
to create cloned, aid-dependent (civic) entities.  
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Third, linking complexity with civic agency illuminates a 
logic of connected processes that can usefully modify the pri-
macy of institutional sectors as a dated model of how respon-
sibilities and accountabilities for social change are allocated. 
Innovations in organisational forms, in public policy and in 
the (political) power of electronic communications through 
cell phones and the web are creating more and more fuzzy 
borders.  Complexity helps describe and explain these as desta-
bilizing evolutionary processes with uncertain outcomes that 
can be explained but cannot be ‘managed’.  
A forth reason is that being more honest about the uncertain-
ties aid faces may actually increase public confidence in what 
development cooperation is trying to do.  When set against 
pre-defined targets which are not achieved, the promise of 
seemingly certain performance sustains public doubt and 
cynicism about aid’s merits.  Peddling unreal expectations cre-
ates the stick with which we being beaten as well as feeding 
opportunities for playing political football with aid budgets. 
A media article with a banner headline “Hulp Die Niet Helpt” 
[Help that doesn’t help] (HP/De Tijd, 8 August 2008) reflects the 
consequences of creating false expectations.
A final reason is that we are not alone or on a professional 
island.  Other fields of social science are exploring the mean-
ing and potential value of applying a complex view to better 
understand and explain social problems.  Why not also in 
development studies?  Is this field so special?  Or is it already 
patently clear within the aid community that complexity 
will be such a ‘disruptive theory’ that is best avoided because 
of what it could expose or require in terms of institutional 
reform?
In sum, though the logic is clear, I am not arguing for a para-
digm shift to overturn some sixty years of aid practice.  But, I 
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am arguing that there is a prima facie case from both theory 
and evidence to undertake an exploration of what complexity 
has to offer the development community.  The sort of agenda 
involved could include the following items.
Investing in a series of (international) discussions or • 
forums which start to systematically probe complexity 
and development to identify the most promising areas for 
dedicated work.  Possible candidates are:
° The tricky relationship between uncertainty and risk in 
external support for uncivil action and disobedience to 
achieve civil ends, such as forming a robust democracy 
and improving respect for difference and rights.
° Investigating the role uncertainty plays in intransigent 
corruption.
° Applying coping with uncertainty in performance stand-
ards as well as in programme monitoring and evalu-
ation with coupling to greater accountability (Guijt, 
2008; Rogers, 2008).  
Fast track communications which make ‘uncertainty’ a • 
positive, honest political message that rebuilds public 
trust in what aid is trying to do. 
Thinking through practical steps of introducing ‘uncer-• 
tainty’ into existing ways that aid institutions work and 
testing the practical value of doing so.  
Following complexity principles, establishing and resourcing 
a network of ‘homes’ for this type of agenda would be a major 
step forward on a long journey.  I hope that you will be inter-
ested in joining me.
__________
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Rector, colleagues, ladies and gentlemen.  I am not sure that 
in the field of development studies the ISS intended to have a 
‘Professor of Uncertainty’.  But it appears that you now have 
one.
My thanks for your attention.
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Notes:
(Endnotes)
1   I am grateful to Irene Guijt and Kees Biekart for com-
ments on a draft of this presentation.
2   The distinction between reformist reforms and non-
reformist reforms is drawn from Gorz, 1964.
3   My thanks to Irene Guijt for this observation.
4   Entropy – the permanent movement towards disor-
der - must be continually countered.  See Rifkin, 1980; 
Cilliers, 1998:122.
5   The ‘butterfly effect’ is both a physical act in weather 
systems and the visual representation of the Lorenz 
attractor. 
6   For examples, see http://www.wikipaedia.org/wiki/post-
modernity.
7   Paul Seabright (2004) argues that trust provides a better 
explanation for how the world has developed economi-
cally than competition.
8   Drawn from an example in Mowles, 2008:813.
9   Berlin, I, 1997:76.
10   The Economist, 18 October, 2008, p. 14.
11   http://www.oneworld.nl/Nieuws/Achtergrond/arti-
cle/15192/Koenders_trekt_alles_uit_de_kast_voor_
behoud_OS
12  http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/en/articles/Connecting-
the-dots/Article-on-complexity
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13   Review comment by Chris Mowles, 2008, <http://
www.thebrokeronline.eu/en/articles/shaping-behaviour/
(issue)/9>
14   Irene Guijt, personal communication, 23rd November 
2008.
15   The Broker, Issue 10, October 2008.  http://www.the-
brokeronline.eu/en/articles/shaping-behaviour/(issue)/10. 
See also the review comments by Mowles.  As with other 
features of configuration, institutions constitute sig-
nificant socially created referents that are themselves 
subject to continual negotiation. 
16   Predispositions can be understand as drivers of agency - 
reproduction, identity and meaning – and psychological 
characteristics of, for example, the asymmetry between 
fear of loss and prospect of gain, security and freedom 
from want and fear.
17   For critics of the premise of sovereignty see: Krasner, 
1999; and Collier and Hoeffler2007. 
18   Drawn from:  Riddell, 2007 and personal observations.
19   See, Carlsson, Kohlin and Ekbom, 1994.  The situation 
they sketch as not changed substantially.
20   Peer review mechanisms highlight but do not show sig-
nificant potential in this regard.  See report by Fabricio 
Pagani: http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/11No4/Feature2.
html
21  A common example is paying civil servants to be present 
at meeting to give a semblance of ownership and legiti-
macy.  For civil servants in the South it is delaying the 
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signing of agreements so that disbursement pressures 
push donors to accommodate demands.
22   A similar case for mislabeling is made by Eric Beinhocker 
(2007) in relation to the economic system.
23   South Africa has a well functioning Independent 
Electoral Commission (IEC) and sound constitutional 
order.  Integrity of the electoral machinery is pretty cer-
tain. Yet the political system is not robust because – for 
unique historical reasons – the ANC has been assured 
victory as a certain outcome.
24   See <www.iss.nl/cdc>
25   Where this condition does not exist – for example under 
autocratic regimes seen in North Korea and Myanmar – 
civic agency is probably moot. 
26   I am grateful to Chris Mowles for sending me this 
paper.
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